Smokefree Policies in Workplaces with Labor Unions
Smokefree workplace policies were adopted for five
Smoking has normally been allowed in automobile
assembly plants for years. For the last
several years, smoking has been prohibited in the offices and other
white-collar areas. However, smoking has
continued in the manufacturing and other blue-collar areas of the plants.
A line-worker in the DaimlerChrysler South Assembly
Plant in
The worker then told her story to the St. Louis Post
Dispatch, which ran a story
Following the news story, the Missouri Department of
Health and Senior Services (DHSS) received a number of complaints in the next
few weeks from employees in automobile assembly plants in the
These reports and subsequent news stories in the
Post Dispatch confirmed the long held practice of allowing smoking throughout
the manufacturing side of the plants as an accepted norm. Quotes from leaders of affected union locals
included:
-
smoking is allowed in the plant “due to the open area of a
plant this size”
-
“It’s a big
building with ventilation throughout and they’re not working shoulder to shoulder
in here. Usually people are six or more
feet apart. You might not even smell the
smoke.”
-
“It’s never
been an issue. The ventilation system is
really good. Most of the smokers are
respectful and, if somebody doesn’t like the smoke, they just don’t smoke
around them. But for the most part over
here we’ve had no problem.”
A spokesman for the DaimlerChrysler’s headquarters
remarked about smoking in the plants as, “Basically, our employees want
it. It’s been (that way) for a long
time.”
Health Agency
Roles
The
This law does not charge any state department with
the authority to implement and enforce this law. Violations of the law include smoking in
other than a designated smoking area or a person in charge allowing someone to
smoke in other than a designated area. Non-compliance
with the 30% maximum size for a designated smoking area is not a
violation. The penalty for violation is
an infraction. With no agency named for
enforcement, the responsibility falls to the local prosecutor.
Because DHSS recognizes that exposure to secondhand
smoke is a de facto health risk, an offer is made to complainants for
DHSS to send a letter to the person in charge informing them of a concern their
facility may not be in compliance with the law, the health risks of secondhand
smoke, an offer to help them get into compliance, and encouragement for them to
adopt a smokefree policy. Complainants
are also informed that DHSS cannot force the person in charge to comply with
the law. Additionally, it is a matter of
practice that the complainant’s identity is not revealed. A blind copy of the letter is offered to the
complainant.
With this information, a majority of complainants
indicated a desire for DHSS to send a letter.
Only a few complainants provided their names and addresses in order to
receive blind copies of the letters.
Within a short period of receiving the letters,
management from each of the automobile assembly plants responded as to their
intentions to abate the complaints.
Although the companies are competitors, their management staff have congenial relations with their counterparts in
each other’s companies. The human
resources (HR) directors for each plant held joint meetings as they viewed this
as a common problem that should be answered with a common solution. This was especially important since the UAW
is at each plant and consistency in response would be vital in acceptance and
implementation.
Partnerships
and Support
An invitation from the plants’ HR directors was made
for DHSS and local clean air coalition members to participate in meetings with
them, to be followed with meetings that would include UAW representation. Coalition members included representatives of
the American Lung Association, National Council on Alcohol & Drug Abuse,
St. Louis County Health Department,
The HR directors were in agreement that after
receiving notification letters from DHSS, the plants were not in compliance
with the state law. However, they did
not desire to merely comply with the law, but to use this situation as an
opportunity to adopt smokefree workplace policies. Assistance was asked of DHSS and the
coalition in providing information and technical assistance, including suggestions
for strategies for implementing such policy.
Prior to the meetings, DHSS convened telephone conference calls with coalition members and Graham Kelder, an attorney with the Organized Labor Tobacco Control Network (OLTCN), part of the Dana Farber Cancer Institute. Mr. Kelder provided good insight into the historical relationships between labor and management, and how to couch concepts into terms more receptive to either side. For example, management would have interest in secondhand smoke as a cause for lost productivity, higher absenteeism due to illness, and higher health care costs. Labor may be more receptive to see secondhand smoke as one more of several workplace safety issues, especially if they can be convinced that secondhand smoke is a known human carcinogen (e.g. “Would you allow your co-worker/employee to be exposed to asbestos, arsenic, radon, etc.? Yet, these and 200 more toxins are in secondhand smoke.”)
Mr. Kelder stressed that a common interest to union membership is reaching retirement. He suggested informing union membership as to how secondhand smoke can affect retirement, whether it is the quality of life in retirement or if the worker will even live to see retirement.
He mentioned that Taft-Hartley Health & Welfare Funds are jointly contributed by management and labor and it is to both’s advantage to reduce health care claims on this fund. That is, the less money spent on health care means more money available for retirement benefits. Unfortunately, both management and UAW for each of the automobile plants stated that Taft-Hartley was not in effect for their locals. But, this should be kept in mind when dealing with unions in other areas.
He also noted that both management and union should be asked what their current collective bargaining agreement stipulates regarding smoking and secondhand smoke and that this can be a topic for future bargaining agreements.
Mr. Kelder agreed that tobacco cessation assistance is essential. Trust and credibility can be lost if cessation assistance is not offered. If coverage is not already provided in the health insurance, it could be made an issue in the next round of collective bargaining. This could also be attractive to management as cessation can bring down health care costs.
Mr. Kelder noted that in past cases, firefighters and cotton mill workers had difficulty proving work-related disability for respiratory ailments when they also were smokers. It is beneficial to employees to have a smokefree environment to encourage reduction/cessation of tobacco use. This could facilitate determination of disability for future claims.
In addition, consultation and materials were obtained from Ms. Susan Weisman, Director of WorkSHIFTS, of the Tobacco Law Project of the William Mitchell College of Law in St. Paul, Minnesota; and from Ms. Debra Chaplan, Director of Special Programs, of the State Building and Construction Trades Council in Oakland, California, which developed the Building Trades Ignite Less Tobacco (BUILT) program to encourage tobacco cessation among blue collar occupations.
In the meeting with management from all the
automobile plants, it was related by DHSS that smokefree policies for
automakers was not without precedent.
Earlier enactment of state or local smokefree workplace legislation in
Management from each plant agreed that secondhand
smoke is a health risk. There concerns
were on how to implement a smokefree policy, obtain cooperation from the UAW
locals, obtain cooperation from the employees, monitor effectiveness, apply
fair enforcement, and offer tobacco cessation assistance. The coalition members from the American Lung
Association and the St. Louis County Health Department offered cessation
assistance training, which was accepted by management.
Management agreed that the policy change should not
be implemented quickly, but that an announcement of the change should be made
at least two months before going into effect.
This would provide employees with time to mentally prepare for the
change and be more accepting when it occurs.
It was anticipated that as the implementation date grew closer, more
interest would be shown in accepting the offer of cessation assistance.
Management then arranged for follow up meetings at
three of the four area plants with participation of the union officers for UAW
local for the particular plant. Using
materials from OLTCN, WorkSHIFTS, BUILT and other sources, the coalition
assembled packets to be distributed at these meetings. Information included the health effects of
secondhand smoke, impact on health care, impact on retirement, and cessation
assistance.
While there were some commonalities of union
concerns at each meeting, the views about prohibiting smoking varied for each
union local. Union officials at the
plant where the employee was featured in the Post Dispatch news story did not
share management’s desire for a smokefree workplace policy throughout the
plant.
At the conclusion of the coalition’s presentation,
some of the union leaders voiced that a single employee was causing problems
for other employees by infringing on their “right” to smoke. They were reminded that DHSS received
complaints from a number of employees in the plant. The local president expressed that this
policy was being forced on them and left the meeting. The other union officials followed.
The meeting with another plant was different from
that of the first plant. Union officials
sat at the conference table among management and coalition members. During the coalition presentation union
officials and plant management asked questions and made comments, allowing for
good dialog. It appeared to be accepted
that secondhand smoke was a health risk and an employee should not be
subjecting a fellow employee to a health risk.
The meeting adjourned on a positive note. In fact, after the meeting several union
officials stayed behind to discuss items one-on-one with coalition members.
A meeting at the third plant began with management
reading a summary statement that the plant was not in compliance with the state
law and that while the primary goal was to achieve compliance, they prefer to
be smokefree. They acknowledged that
this may be a contract negotiating issue.
After the coalition presentation, one of the
management staff asked if after being informed that secondhand smoke is a
health risk and they continued to allow smoking in the plant, could the company
face a liability suit if a non-smoking employee exposed to on-the-job
secondhand smoke would develop a smoking related disease. Likewise, could the UAW be sued if they
successfully resisted efforts for the plant to be smokefree? The coalition responded that management and
labor would have to consult their respective attorneys for advice.
A union official stated this would be a cultural
change and as such, should be approached slowly and through education. He stated that in 1953 the UAW fought for the
right to smoke on the line; that any right is not so easily wrested away; and
that a right taken from one group of union members will be viewed as an attack
on all union members.
The coalition pointed out that in 1953, the danger
of smoking, much less secondhand smoke, was not known; and much has been
learned in the last half-century. Now
knowing the health effects, is it still a right for one group of union members
to cause harm to their fellow non-smoking union members?
The union official also stated that the dilution
factor is not being considered. The
plant is approximately 79 acres, has 35 foot high ceilings and high air
exchanges. He asked what proof could be
shown that secondhand smoke is really a danger on the line.
The coalition had obtained information from James
Repace, a health physicist with a specialization in ventilation and secondhand
smoke exposure. Mr. Repace had conducted
a study in a tool-and-die factory with comparable dimensions. He had found that air samples from the line
and biological samples from nonsmokers indicated chemicals from secondhand
smoke were detected. A suggestion was
made for monitoring the air quality on the line, but the union official did not
respond.
Management related that one line worker told him
that she had tried quitting smoking several times and that the smokefree policy
would give her the incentive to quit for good.
He stated he saw a positive attitude among most employees regarding
implementation of a smokefree policy.
Management at each plant considered that smoking
cessation assistance may be more attractive to union members if the companies
covered most or all of the expenses and if the assistance could be provided on
company time.
Outcomes
The smokefree workplace policies were enacted at the
Ford Motor Company on November 3, 2003 (this also included their plant in the
Kansas City area); both DaimlerChrysler plants effective after Christmas break
on January 5, 2004; and at the General Motors plant on effective on March 1,
2004 when the employees returned to the job after the plant was re-tooled for
the next model year.
It was recognized that some smoking employees would
likely test the enforcement of the policy or would try to sneak a smoke. After the effective date of the policies,
DHSS continued to receive some complaints about secondhand smoke. However, the bulk of complaints concerned the
one plant where the union representatives were not supportive of the policy.
DHSS forwarded
all complaints to the HR staff of the plants for investigation. Several complaints concerned outside contract
employees. The contractors were informed
of the company policy and the smoking discontinued. Other complaints alleged that union stewards
and line supervisors ignored smoking on the line. It is not known if these complaints were
justified or corrected.
Lessons Learned
While there are commonalities among union locals,
each one has their own unique culture.
Whether overtly displayed or not, union members may be skeptical of
“outsiders” especially if it may impact their culture. When working with the private sector, it is
important to earn credibility for factual information and that your interests
are for the common good.
Employee participation in cessation assistance was lower
than hoped. Anecdotal information was
shared with management that an automobile plant in
Only one plant provided DHSS a copy of their smokefree policy. It is not known if internal policies are considered proprietary information or if there were other reasons for not providing copies.
Some complainants requested DHSS to investigate for violation of the state law. Although the smokefree policy is voluntary by the companies, the state law requires that smoking is only permitted in designated smoking areas and since none are established, any smoking indoors would be a violation of the law. Regardless, DHSS has no authority to enter the plants to independently assess policy compliance. Information about investigations or resolution of complaints were not provided by management.
While several employers in Missouri have previously adopted smokefree workplace policies, the publicity about the automobile plants adoption of such policies had a ripple effect where several other employers, including manufacturing companies, also adopted policies for either totally smokefree workplaces or have severely restricted where smoking may be permitted.
Events and information subsequent to the meetings with plant management and union officials may be helpful to other health departments and coalitions that may need to interact with these parties. These relate to health care costs, employer cost/benefits calculation for tobacco cessation assistance, and the potential for employee litigation. While the litigation information is not suggested to be used as a “scare tactic” the information could still be provided.
Cost of Health Care
Health care costs will likely become a driving
force for smokefree workplace policies and tobacco cessation assistance. Former U.S. Health and Human Services
Secretary Tommy Thompson pointed out in an April, 2005 speech at the Detroit
Regional Chamber of Commerce that the rising cost of caring for employees and
retirees is a significant problem for automakers, who
spent $10 billion on health care last year.
Thompson marveled that health care expenses now cost an average of
$1,525 per vehicle for
Yet, education for UAW leadership is still needed. In response to Thompson’s observation, UAW union president Ron Gettelfinger said he doesn't support a ban on smoking in assembly plants as a way to lower health care costs, saying automakers should be more concerned with the chemicals workers are exposed to than with smoking. He is clearly unaware that secondhand smoke contains more than 4000 chemicals, 200 of which are toxic and 69 are carcinogenic; and that secondhand smoke can have a synergistic effect with fumes from solvents, welding and other workplace exposures.
Several
organizations have produced cost/benefit models to help employers determine the
economic impact of offering tobacco cessation assistance to their
employees. One such model is available
as a web-based interactive return on investment tool online from
As the potential for litigation was asked by management
staff at one plant, it was found that North Dakota Attorney General Wayne
Stenehjem issued an opinion on
As the one UAW official had commented earlier that in 1953
they fought for the right to smoke on the line, Attorney General Stenehjem’s
opinion also noted that courts have upheld smoke workplace policies, rejecting
claims that there is a right to smoke. (Fagan v. Axelrod, 550 N.Y.S.2d 552, 558 [N.Y. Sup.
Workers compensation suits are also increasingly becoming a factor.
A non-smoking, otherwise healthy waiter who suffered a heart attack as a result of working in a smoke-filled bar received $85,000 in a workers' compensation lawsuit. (Ubhi v. State Compensation Insurance Fund, Cat 'n' Fiddle Restaurant, California Workers' Compensation Appeals Board, 1990).
Nonsmoking
workers harmed by secondhand smoke in the workplace have won lawsuits against
their employers based on a number of issues, including Workers' Compensation,
Unemployment Compensation, Wrongful Termination, Negligence, and Disability
Benefits (Sweda, E., Summary of Legal Cases Regarding Smoking in the Workplace
and Other Places.
In McCarthy vs. Department of
Social and Health Services, the Washington Supreme Court held that pulmonary
disease caused by secondhand smoke was not considered to be a disease or injury
covered by the Washington State Labor and Industries Workers' Compensation
Act. Employees can sue their employers
under common tort law for harm caused by the employer's decision to expose them
to a known cancer-causing agent, secondhand smoke. A business owner's Commercial General Liability
policy also excludes secondhand smoke claims where the Standard Pollution
Exclusion excludes bodily injury claims from smoke and noxious fumes. Seasoned underwriters and adjusters,
all have concluded that there is absolutely no coverage under a CGL policy. (DeLorenzo, Dan, “Warning: Smoke is hazardous to business health”
The News Tribune [
“What’s in Tobacco Smoke” one-page flyer by Health EDCO
“Secondhand Smoke - - It’s no joke” Channing L. Bete Co., Inc. 1993.
“You
Can Quit Smoking”
“Breaking Free from Smoking Addiction” Channing L. Bete Co., Inc. 1998.
“Quitting Smoking – Common Problems, Good Solutions” Journeyworks Publishing, 2002.
“How to Help a Friend or Family Member Quit Smoking” Journeyworks Publishing, 2001.
Contact Information
Community Tobacco Use Prevention Program Coordinator
Health Promotion Unit
Division of Community Health
Section of Chronic Disease Prevention & Health Promotion
920 Wildwood
Phone: 573-522-2820
Fax: 573-522-2899